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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INTERPRETATION OF "IN FACT'' CLAUSE 
OF SECTION 2036 AND DEDUCTIBILITY OF SUPPORT RIGHTS OF WIFE-Having 
decided to separate, but desiring to avoid the publicity of a judicial pro-
ceeding, decedent and his wife executed an agreement which called for the 
transfer of securities to a trust, the income of which was to be paid to the 
wife for her life or until her remarriage, with a reversionary interest in 
the decedent. In consideration for the transfer, the wife relinquished 
her right to support by the decedent. Both parties were represented by 
attorneys in the arms-length negotiations leading to the agreement. 
About six. years after the separation, during which time neither party 
took steps to procure judicial sanction for the arrangement, the decedent 
died unexpectedly. The Commissioner included the trust corpus in the 
gross estate of the decedent under section 811 (c) (1) (B) of the 1939 
code1 and denied a deduction from the gross estate for the value of the 
1 "The value of the gross estate shall include • • • any interest • • . [in property] 
of which decedent has •.• made a transfer under which he has retained ••• for any 
period which does not in fact end before his death-•.• the right to the income from 
the property. . . ." Now I.R.C., §2036. 
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support rights of the wife under authority of section 811 (i)2 and section 
812 (b).3 The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's position. Section 
811 (c) (1) (B) applies despite the fact that the decedent did not intend 
to retain possession and enjoyment of the property for a period which 
would extend beyond his death. Also, support rights of a wife are em-
braced within the meaning of "other marital rights" in section 812 (b). 
Estate of Robert M. McKeon v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 697 (1956). 
In seeking to impose tax liability on the taxpayer in the principal 
suit, the Commissioner refused to follow both a treasury regulation,4 which 
would have excluded the property from the taxpayer's gross estate, and 
an Internal Revenue Service ruling,5 which would have allowed a deduc-
tion from the gross estate for the amount of wife's support rights. In 
the wake of such action by the Commissioner, a taxpayer can hardly be 
certain as to how much he can safely rely upon these materials in 'the 
future. The regulation mentioned interprets· the "in fact" clause of 
section 811 (c) (1) (B) of the 1939 code to mean that the decedent must 
intend for the retention of income to extend at least for the duration of 
his life and that such intention may be evidenced by the period of reten-
tion itself.6 Support for this position of the Treasury is found in pre-
enactment materials in which Congress gives, as one example of the in-
tended thrust of the clause, the case of a decedent, seventy years old, who 
reserves the income from transferred property for an extended term and 
who then dies before the term ends.7 A literal reading of the statute, 
however, requires a finding of the mere fact that there actually was a reten-
tion of a right to the income from transferred property for a period which 
does not end before his death.8 While a literal interpretation of the "in 
fact" clause clearly sweeps the trust property of the principal case into 
the gross estate, a reading in of a requirement of intention would allow 
the property to be excluded since the taxpayer here did not expect to 
die before his wife's remarriage or death., Unfortunately, the Tax Court 
does not discuss the issue of whether a transfer under the circumstances 
2 Now I.R.C., §2053 (c) (I). 
3 " ••• [A] relinquishment ••• of dower •.. or of other marital rights in the 
decedent's property or estate, shall not be • • '. a consideration 'in money or money's 
worth.' " Now I.R.C., §2043 (b). 
4 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.18. 
Ii 1946·2 Cum. Bul. 166. 
6 A suggestion that it may be significant whether the decedent intended the transfer 
of property to extend beyond his own life is found in Estate of Donnelly v. Commissioner, 
38 B.T .A. 1234, 1240 (1938), revd. on other grounds by Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce 
Bank &: Trust Co., (8th Cir. 1940) Ill F. (2d) 224. 
7 See 1939-1 Cum. Bul. 491, 532. The "in fact" clause was intended to clarify certain 
problems arising under the Joint Resolution of March 31, 1931, 46 Stat. 1516, which 
was passed in an effort to reach transfers under which the decedent reserved the income 
for his life. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the pre-enactment materials themselves, 
see Marks v. Higgins, (2d Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 884. 
s On the question of balancing the literal words of the statute with the history of 
the legislation, see Wright, "Transfer of Joint Property in Contemplation of Death," 
55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1 (1956). 
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of the present case, which was made with no intention of avoiding the 
estate tax, should be dealt with in the same manner as a transfer with the 
principal purpose of avoiding tax liability, although the effect of the 
decision is clearly that both shall be treated alike. By adopting a literal 
interpretation of the statute, the court has at least eliminated the adminis-
trative problem of ascertaining the intention of the decedent, as well as 
eliminating a possible avenue for tax evasion. 
In 1946, the Internal Revenue Service issued E.T. 19,9 which stated that 
£or both estate and gift tax purposes, a release of support rights by a wife 
may, if computed reasonably, constitute consideration in money or money's 
worth. The basis of the ruling is that the husband normally has a legal 
duty ·to support his wife at least for the period of their joint lives,10 and 
that, therefore, a transfer of property to meet this obligation is not such 
a transfer as would deplete the estate of the decedent to any greater ex-
tent than would have occurred had periodic payments been made by 
decedent for the period of his expected life. A transfer by a decedent to 
meet the obligation of supporting his children, which is comparable to a 
transfer to support a wife, has unanimously been regarded as a deductible 
claim from the decedent's estate.11 Moreover, had the transfer in the 
present case not been founded upon an agreement but upon a court de-
cree,1~ then the requirement of "consideration in money or money's worth" 
would not apply and the value of the wife's support rights would clearly 
have been deductible from the estate.13 Policy-wise, it therefore appears 
anomalous to impose a tax here because of the absence of a judicial de-
cree. While the court's holding that support rights of the wife are em-
braced in the phrase "other marital rights in the decedent's property or 
estate" does accord with several judicial pronouncements on the point,14 
it is not so venerable a conclusion as to be beyond question.16 The claim 
of a ·wife to support from her husband is not literally an interest "in de-
cedent's property or estate," any more than a contract or tort claim against 
the estate is an interest in his property.16 Neither policy considerations 
9 See note 5 supra. 
10 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws §104 {1932). 
11 Estate of Phillips, 36 B.T .A. 752 (1937); Commissioner v. Weiser, (10th Cir. 1940) 
113 F. (2d) 486; Helvering v. United States Trust Co., (2d Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 576. 
12 The phrase "when founded upon a promise or agreement" in §2053 was intended 
to insure the deductibility of tort claims and other obligations imposed by law. S. Rep. 
655, 72d Cong., 1st sess., p. 51 (1932). 
. 13 Estate of Silas Mason v. Commissioner, 43 B.T .A. 813 (1941); Harris v. Com-
missioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Helvering v. United States Trust Co., note 11 supra. 
This decretal obligation test is strongly criticized by Taylor and Schwartz, "Tax Aspects 
of Marital Property Settlements," 7 TAX L. REv. 19 at 38 (1951). 
14 Commissioner v. Maresi, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 929; Meyer's Estate v. Com-
missioner, (2d Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 367; Helvering v. United States Trust Co., note 11 
supra. 
15 Edythe Young v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939); Estate of Brokaw, 39 B.T.A. 
783 (1939). 
lG See dissent of Judge Learned Hand in Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, note 14 
supra. 
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nor a literal reading of the statute dictate the result reached by the Tax 
Court, which has, in effect, silently overruled E.T. 19. 
Nathan B. Driggers, S. Ed. 
